This article examines the historical evolution of the law of occupation from two angles. First, it analyses scholarly discourse and practice with respect to the general prohibition on the Occupying Power making changes to the laws and administrative structure of the occupied country, as embodied in Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. Many Occupying Powers and scholars have endeavoured to rationalize exceptions to this 'general principle' governing the entire corpus of the law of occupation. Their studies support the contingent nature of the law of occupation, with its interpretation being dependent on different historical settings and social context. The second part of the article focuses on how the law of occupation that evolved as a European project has rationalized excluding the system of colonialism from the framework of that law. The historical assessment of this body of jus in bello would be incomplete and biased if it did not address the narratives of such structural exclusivity.
The main body of the article is divided into two parts. The first part examines the historical development of the general corpus of the law of occupation from its nascent period in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars until the present day. In so doing, it will focus specifically on the interplay between the general rule predicated on the 'conservationist' principle and the concept of 'necessity', both of which are drawn from Article 43 of the 1899/1907 Hague Regulations (and later Article 64 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention). Under the 'conservationist' principle, Occupying Powers cannot make changes to the local laws and administrative authorities of the occupied state. 3 However, exceptions to this general principle are allowed if an Occupying Power is 'absolutely prevented' from respecting the local laws. This is considered to embody the concept of 'necessity'. Further, the two-tier approach inherent in this provision (the 'conservationist' principle as the general rule, with the 'concept of necessity' providing grounds for exceptions to that rule) is also discernible under Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, albeit with some changes.
In contrast, the second part critiques the historical discourses that have been presented to justify the system of colonialism as operating outside the normative regime on occupation. It will highlight how the mainstream doctrines on occupation overlooked a side current of anti-colonialist ethos on the part of the colonized peoples during the colonial era. It is the present writer's belief that, in our post-colonial world, the historical examinations of the law of occupation would be incomplete without analysing how the occupations that led to colonial control were placed outside the constraints of the law of occupation. It ought to be highlighted again that, while the 'necessity' grounds as exceptions to the general principle under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations (and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention) are 'endogenous' elements contemplated within the framework on the law of occupation, the debarring of the colonial context from the realm of the law of occupation was the structural issue of inequity underlying this body of law. This part is intended to challenge the effect of narrowly compartmentalizing our analytical framework in the existing study of the law of occupation.
Historical evolution of the law of occupation with special regard to the 'conservationist principle'
Overview
In this part, we will explore the genesis and the historical evolution of the normative framework of the law of occupation with special regard to the 'conservationist' principle. As outlined above, this is one of the general principles that have governed the entire normative edifice of the law of occupation. It indicates that Occupying Powers are generally not entitled to modify local laws and administrative structures in the occupied territories. Clearly, this flows from the underlying assumptions of the law of occupation. The Occupying Power does not acquire sovereignty of the ousted occupied state. Instead, its role is to act only as a temporary custodian of the territory until the end of occupation. 4 The interaction between the conservationist principle and the concept of 'necessity' as an exception to this principle provides the microcosm for scholarly discourses and propositions on the law of occupation as a whole. 5 As will be discussed below, the parameters of 'necessity' grounds can be (over-)stretched with a view to claiming expanded legislative authority to enforce policy objectives in occupied territories, or merely for the purpose of justifying disregarding specific rules of the law of occupation.
The genesis of the legal regime of occupation
In the Enlightenment period, classic scholars such as Vattel, 6 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 7 [178] [179] and 230, paras. 150 (humane treatment of prisoners of war) and 200 (noting that, despite the right of the conqueror to seize the public property, the individuals retain their property). However, the law of occupation, as distinguished from the right of conquest, was yet to evolve. Nowhere in this treatise can we find any reference to the legal terminology of occupation. See also Eyal Benvenisti, 'The Origins of the Concept of Belligerent Occupation', in Law and History Review, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2008, pp. 622, 624-625 (discussing Vattel's absence of distinction between an occupier and a conqueror). 7 While not providing a distinct legal regime of occupation as such, Rousseau considered war as a phenomenon that could only exist between governments, and stressed the immunity of the lives and property of private persons. He argued that: 'War is therefore in no way a relation between a man and another man, but a relation between a state and another state, in which the individual persons are enemies only accidentally, not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers . . . Even in full-blown war, a just prince surely seizes, in an enemy state, all that appertains to public life, but he respects the person and property of the individuals'. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Contrat social ou principes du droit politique, 2nd edition, Bureaux de la Publication, Paris, 1865, Livre 1, IV ('De l'esclavage'), p. 24 (translation from French by the present author). The original French text reads: 'La guerre n'est donc point une relation d'homme à homme, mais une relation d'Etat à Etat, dans laquelle les particuliers ne sont ennemis qu'accidentellement, non point comme hommes, ni même comme citoyens, mais comme soldats . . . Même en pleine guerre, un the laws of war, including the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, and the sparing of the lives and property of non-combatants from the scourges of war. 9 The so-called Rousseau-Portalis doctrine suggests that war was characterized as a relationship between states, not between individuals. 10 Admittedly, this doctrine was developed at a time when jurists made little distinction between the notion of occupation and that of conquest. The ensuing French Revolution and the Napoleonic War, and the seeds of revolution and (romanticized) nationalism that were sown by the former across western Europe from the end of the eighteenth century well into the first half of the nineteenth century, challenged the conservative monarchical foundation of the political and constitutional orders in continental Europe. 11 The rudimentary building block of the law of belligerent occupation can be considered as having emerged as a technique of managing such chaotic territorial and constitutional/ administrative orders. 12 In other words, it was the fruit of the geopolitical and constitutional changes that swept throughout western Europe at the turn of the nineteenth century. 13 Revolutionaries declared and waged wars on absolute monarchies in other countries while acting to liberate the oppressed local populations. They did so while firmly convinced of the benefits to the populace. Indeed, the French Constitution of 3 September 1791 specifically declared that 'the French nation renounces the undertaking of any war with a view of making conquests, and it will never use its forces against the liberty of any people'. 14 Many such revolutionaries acted for the purpose of emancipating populations oppressed by their monarchs. 15 prince juste s'empare bien, en pays ennemi, de tout ce qui appartient au public, mais il respecte la personne et les biens des particuliers'. 8 Georg F. von Martens, Precis du droit des gens moderne de l'Europe, J. C. Dieterich, Göttingen, 1789, Vol.
II, Livre VIII, in particular Chapter III, para. 234, pp. 343-344 (prohibition of attacks against women, children, and the aged), and para. 235, pp. 345-346 (protection of rights as prisoners of war for the vanquished soldiers, except by way of retaliation against 'barbaric peoples'). 9 See, however, Karma Nabulsi's critique of the prevailing understanding that Rousseau was the founder of this key principle of the modern laws of war (distinction between combatants and non-combatants): Karma Nabulsi, What emerged in the wake of the conservative European order restored by Metternich's Congress of Vienna were the 'principles' of the maintenance (or restoration) of sovereignty and independence of the states occupied during the Napoleonic Wars, despite many territorial alterations. 16 Admittedly, these principles were ingrained in the well-established 'right to security' and independence of sovereign states. 17 However, they were yet to be recognized as discrete principles of the law of occupation. The principles befitted the reactionary inclination of the Holy Alliance of 1815, premised on the delicate balance of power. With the ideas of liberalism and national self-determination already disseminated across Europe by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the two other revolutions originating from France in 1830 and 1848 triggered popular revolts to demand constitutional reforms and political realignments throughout the Continent. This gradually contributed to the emerging European order of ethno-linguistic nation-states based on the idea of national sovereignty, an idea that can arguably be traced back to the post-Westphalian European order. 18 It is in this transformative period in Europe that the legal regime of occupation came to be separated conceptually from that of conquest. 19 Unlike the notion of conquest, which gave valid sovereign title to conquered territories, occupation was understood as leaving the sovereignty of the ousted government intact.
Tracing the origin of the 'conservationist' premise of the law of occupation at a scholarly level
The historical origin of the 'conservationist' premise of the law of occupation 20 can be traced through examinations of classic treatises. Both Hersch Lauterpacht 21 and (discussing pillage, vandalism, and rape as booty of war in occupied Rhineland and Spain); Marc Blancpain, La vie quotidienne dans la France du Nord sous les occupations (1814-1944), Hachette, Paris, 1983, p. 21 (describing crimes of rape, pillage, and vandalism that were returned in kind by the Cossacks and the Asian cavalry of the occupying Russian army in northern France), as cited in K. Nabulsi, above note 9, p. 24. 16 In the post-Napoleonic period, for some German states that had formed part of the Holy Roman Empire -such as Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, and Oldenburg -the new era provided the much-needed opportunity to restore political sovereignty and territories lost during the Rheinbund years. For other states, the era gave occasion to proceed with the integration of German-speaking states through the German Confederation. See also the extensive rights to take the property of the occupied or conquered territories: ibid., para. 239, p. 349, arguing that 'the enemy is equally authorized to seize the property of their enemy . . . either the immovable property (Conquéte, Eroberung) or the movable property (Butin, Beute), not only 1) to obtain what is owed to it or an equivalent, but also 2) to compensate for the cost of the war, and 3) to oblige the enemy to consent to an equitable peace, and finally 4) to deprive the enemy of the desire or the forces to renew the insults that gave rise to the war' (translated into English by the present author); the original reads: 'L'ennemi est également autorisé à s'emparer des biens de l'ennemi . . . soit des biens immeubles (Conquéte, Eroberung), soit des biens meubles (Butin, Beute), tant 1) pour obtenir ce qui lui est dû ou un équivalent, que 2) pour se dédommager des frais de la guerre & 3) pour obliger l'ennemie à donner les mains à une paix équitable, enfin 4) pour ôter à l'ennemi l'envie ou les forces de renouveller les injures qui ont donné lieu à la guerre'.
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Contrary to the preservationist tenet of the later Hague Regulations, the conqueror was 'not obliged to preserve the constitution of a conquered country or province, nor to leave the subjects in possession of the rights and privileges granted them by their former sovereign'. 28 Many scholars agree that the hallmarks of the conservationist principle, such as the limitations on the Occupying Power's right to amend local legislation in occupied territories and their right to administer public property, 29 were gradually recognized in the period of social transformation in Europe in the early to mid-nineteenth century.
Drafting the law of occupation and the consolidation of the conservationist principle in the late nineteenth century
In the political climate of post-1848 Europe, the 'conservationist' principle became a suitable normative vehicle not only for the conservative status quo for the powerful states but also for emerging nation-states, which favoured the protection of the lives and property of their citizens while being keen to keep their laws intact in the eventuality of occupation by another state. 30 Later, from the mid-nineteenth century onward, the principle of preservation of (or minimum disturbance to) laws and administrative structures of occupied territories matched the interests of the rising bourgeoisie as well. Consistent with laissez-faire philosophy, 31 this principle was deployed to minimize any adverse impact of occupation on the rights of private individuals' (including the right to private property). 32 According to Karma Nabulsi, the conservationist premises of the law of occupation were consolidated by the moderate conservative instinct of the mainstream (bourgeois) international lawyers who played a crucial role in drafting key legal texts on the laws of war in the second half of the nineteenth century. 33 Y. Arai-Takahashi -Preoccupied with occupation: critical examinations of the historical development of the law of occupation favoured a law-and-order approach and the preservation of the status quo of the local territory (the approach underlying what Nabulsi dubs the 'Grotian tradition of war'). 35 Across the Atlantic, when providing regulations on the Union's occupation of Confederate territories during the American Civil War, Francis Lieber confined the prescriptive capacity of the occupier to the case of 'military necessity' under Article 3 of the 1863 Code. This provision read that:
Martial Law in a hostile country consists in the suspension, by the occupying military authority, of the criminal and civil law, and of the domestic administration and government in the occupied place or territory, and in the substitution of military rule and force for the same, as well as in the dictation of general laws, as far as military necessity requires this suspension, substitution, or dictation. The commander of the forces may proclaim that the administration of all civil and penal law shall continue either wholly or in part, as in times of peace, unless otherwise ordered by the military authority. 36 Given the close friendship between this German émigré and Johan Caspar Bluntschli, it is very likely that the textual structure of this provision influenced the framing of the corresponding provisions on the occupier's legislative power in the subsequent Brussels Declaration and Oxford Manual, of which Bluntschli was one of the key architects. 37 The origin of Article 43 of the 1899/1907 Hague Regulations
To understand how the conservationist principle and the 'concept of necessity' exception to this were embodied in Article 43 of both the 1899 and the 1907 Hague Regulations, 38 it is important to look briefly at their precursors: Articles 2 and 3 of the Brussels Declaration of 1874. Article 2 of the Brussels Declaration states that:
The authority of the legitimate Power being suspended and having in fact passed into the hands of the Occupying Power, the latter shall take all the measures in its power to restore and ensure, so far as possible, public order and safety. 39 35 K. Nabulsi, above note 9, p. 172. When employing the term 'Grotian tradition of war', she focuses her analysis on the making of laws of war from 1874 to 1949. Hence, she does not suggest that the seed for the conservationist principle of the law of occupation had already been sown in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia (1648). 
Article 3 of this aborted treaty then provides that: 'To this end, it shall maintain the laws which were in force in the country in time of peace, and shall not modify, suspend or replace them unless necessary.' 40 Prima facie, these two provisions seem incoherent. While Article 2 appears to accord the occupiers a wide range of legislative authority, Article 3 makes the exercise of this competence conditional on the concept of necessity. Nevertheless, when Articles 2 and 3 of the Brussels Declaration are considered in conjunction, it becomes clear that both the power to modify, suspend, or replace under Article 3 and also the power to enact ('prendra toutes les mesures') under Article 2 can be exercised in case of necessity. 41 While the Brussels Declaration never entered into force, the normative contents and textual structure (the general rule on the occupant's legislative authority, qualified by the exception to this rule in case of necessity) were grafted onto Articles 43-44 of the Oxford Manual, which was adopted by the Institut de Droit International in 1880. 42 Subsequently, the two apparently incongruous provisions of the Brussels Declaration were eventually integrated into the single provision in the 1899 Hague Regulations. This was prompted by the need to resolve the main controversy among the delegates of the First Peace Conference at The Hague (1899), where it was severely disputed whether Article 3 of the Brussels Declaration should be retained to prevent sweeping changes in the law of an occupied territory. At the seventh session of the Hague Conference, on 8 June 1899, some representatives highlighted the importance of this provision for small powers in view of the constraints imposed on the belligerent Occupying Power by the words 'que s'il y a nécessité'. In contrast, the alternative proposal was to delete this provision and to give Occupying Powers greater scope for legislative capacity in return for certain specific obligations. 43 When the vote was taken, this provision was maintained by a narrow margin (13 votes against 10 and one abstention), at least until further discussion at a later session. 44 At the Eighth Session, Mr. Bihourd, the representative of France, 40 The authentic French reads: 'A cet effet, il maintiendra les lois qui étaient en vigueur dans le pays en temps de paix, et ne les modifiera, ne les suspendra ou ni les remplacera que s'il y a nécessité'. suggested a compromise. He proposed that, while Article 3 should be eliminated, its spirit should be integrated into Article 2. The relevant part of his proposal read 'en respectant, sauf empêchement absolu, les lois en viguer dans le pays' ('respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country'). 45 It was therefore due to Bihourd's proposal that the key phrase 'sauf empêchement absolu' ('unless absolutely prevented') was introduced in the authentic French text of the 1899/1907 Hague Regulations 46 in lieu of the wording 's'il y a nécessité' that had appeared in Article 3 of the Brussels Declaration and Article 44 of the Oxford Manual. In any event, the difference in terminology was only semantic. Jurists have come to interpret the term 'sauf empêchement absolu' as embodying the concept of 'necessity', 47 a concept that has become the subject of much debate in scholarly legal study. 48 The law of occupation during World War I Many occupation measures taken during World War I constituted the first challenges to the interpretation of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. This was discernible mainly in relation to the two diametrically opposed positions: the measures adopted by the German occupying authorities in Belgium during the war; and the post-war Belgian decisions of invalidating the laws promulgated during the period of occupation. Charles Rousseau notes that the general rule on legislative authority was also bent by the British commander-in-chief as the occupying authority of Ottoman Turkey's Mesopotamia (the area in which the British later created the Kingdom of Iraq). 49 Further, the sketchy provision in the Hague Regulations regarding protection of the civilian population under occupation proved inadequate in dealing with the deportation of civilians in occupied Belgium and northern France during World War I. 50 interwar period the Tokyo draft text dealing with protection of civilian populations, which would provide the basis for the later Fourth Geneva Convention. 51 During World War I, the German occupying authorities in Belgium discarded all the constraints imposed by the Hague Regulations in order to undertake a wholesale change in administrative and legal structures. 52 They construed Article 43 of the Hague Regulations as authorizing the transfer of the expanded legislative authority to the German 'Government General'. 53 The implementation of this policy included such far-reaching administrative changes as the attempted alterations in occupied Belgium's political framework in favour of the then disadvantaged Flemish. 54 Charles de Visscher considered that the German measures amounted to abuse of the occupant's power in a manner analogous to the doctrine of French administrative law, 'l'excès de pouvoir et le détournement de pouvoir' ('acting in excess of authority and the abuse of power'). 55 In contrast, the post-war practice of the Belgian courts was that any act passed by the German occupying authorities was illegal. 56 German interpretation designed to justify their extensive prescriptive power during World War I was vehemently contested in a number of Belgian court decisions. 57 In the The law of occupation in relation to World War II
As noted by Benvenisti, during World War II, the three main Axis powers -Germany, Italy, and Japan -as well as the USSR, were engaged in a practice of occupation that completely disregarded and rejected the fundamental tenets of the law of occupation. These countries attempted to effectuate perpetual control by way of the annexation of occupied territories or through the establishment of puppet states. 69 As is widely known, a spate of atrocities committed in the occupied territories during World War II demonstrated a barbaric form of occupation, as exemplified by the Nazi's ideology-based practice designed to implement the Holocaust. 70 The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) provided the famous dictum that the rules embodied in the Hague Regulations were declaratory of customary international law by 1939. 71 A closer inspection reveals, however that this dictum ought to be carefully analysed to grasp the process of such evolution. The relevant part reads:
The rules of land warfare expressed in the [1907 Hague] Convention undoubtedly represented an advance over existing international law at the time of their adoption. But the convention expressly stated that it was an attempt 'to revise the general laws and customs of war', which it thus recognized to be then existing, but by 1939 these rules laid down in the Convention were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war which are referred to in Article 6(b) of the [ If we take the view that the bulk of the law of occupation under the 1899/1907 Hague Regulations was not declaratory of customary laws when adopted as treatybased rules, it must have undergone the process of hardening into customary law somewhere in the period between 1899 and 1939. However, it is not possible to pinpoint the moment at which the rules on occupation prescribed in the 1899 Hague Regulations matured into customary rules. 73 Nevertheless, one can contend that, by the time all the relevant rules under the 1899 Hague Regulations were reiterated in the 1907 Hague Regulations, the gist of the doctrines on occupation had 'crystallized'. 74 This view can be borne out by the wording of the preamble of the Second Hague Convention of 1899, whose identical counterpart in the preamble of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 was quoted by the IMT: 'Thinking it important . . . to revise the laws and general customs of war, either with the view of defining them more precisely or of laying down certain limits for the purpose of modifying their severity as far as possible'. 75 It ought to be recalled that both the conservationist principle and the 'concept of necessity' exception stipulated in Article 43 of the 1899/1907 Hague Regulations found equivalents in their antecedents (the Lieber Code, the Oxford Manual, and the Brussels Declaration). As discussed in the preceding sections, we can at least surmise that the conservationist principle that was already fleshed out in legal discourses of the mid-nineteenth century has been anchored in the bedrock of customary law longer than other detailed rules on occupation.
The Allied occupations in the immediate aftermath of World War II
Following World War II, the Allied and Soviet occupations of territories of Germany, Italy, Austria, other Axis countries in Europe, and Japan foreshadowed the already nascent Cold War rivalry. They furnished experimental grounds for two competing economic and political ideologies, 76 which provided much of the political impetus to throw away the Hague Regulations' conservationist baggage. 77 In essence, these occupations were the first prototypes of 'transformative' occupation geared toward democratization. The joint Allied occupation of southern and central Italian territories, unlike the regimes of belligerent occupation established in Sicily and northern Italy, can be explained on the basis of the armistice agreement. 78 Irrespective of the legal bases, the Allied authorities undertook to rescind fascist laws. The United States' occupation of post-war Japan, with its wide range of 73 E. Benvenisti In contrast, there has been a cacophony of justifications for the Allied policy-oriented objective of carrying out de-Nazification and radical democratic reforms in West Germany. In anticipation of their occupations and policy of implementing sweeping reforms in laws and institutions, the western Allies insisted on unconditional surrender so that they could be exempt from the conservationist principle and other constraints of the Hague Regulations. One might argue that, while sovereignty continued to be vested in the German population, the Allied powers exercised 'sovereign rights' that they conferred upon themselves. 80 Despite the Allies' avowed intention to exclude the law of occupation as the source of their authority, some commentators explain the Allies measures within the framework of the Hague Regulations. Their methodology is to infer justifications from the 'necessity' exceptions under Article 43. The thrust of their argument is that retaining the Nuremberg race laws and other Nazi enactments would have endangered the security of the Occupying Power. 81 On the other hand, other writers regard the Allied occupation of Germany 82 as the typical example of debellatio (subjugation), following the total collapse of effective government and the complete control effected by the occupying armed forces. 83 Hans Kelsen expressly contended that Germany as a sovereign state ceased to exist, 84 of the central and local governments in their entirety (debellatio). 85 Empirically, it was the crumbling of the Nazi government that was pivotal for the Allies assuming the authority for occupation, 86 and this without awaiting Doenitz's signing of unconditional surrender proclaimed by the Declaration of Berlin of 5 June 1945. 87 In the present writer's opinion, it seems formalistic to attach much normative weight to that Declaration, given that none of the German governmental machinery existed by that time. However, in developments after World War II, the doctrine of debellatio soon became archaic. As Benvenisti notes, 88 it was deemed irreconcilable with the ideas of peoples' sovereignty and self-determination embodied in the UN Charter. 89 Further, Article 2(2) Common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 contemplates the broad applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention without considering the exceptional case of debellatio. Accordingly, if the Allied occupation of Germany had taken place after 1949, this would have been fully governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention. 90 Subject to Articles 47 and 6(3) of that Convention, 91 the Allies' transformative policies would have been defended more cogently on the basis of the broader parameters of what constitutes necessity set out in Article 64 of the Convention.
Article 64 of the fourth Geneva Convention
Since 1949, Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention has served as a complement to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. It has been widely noted by earlier writers that the structure of the former provision is designed as 'an amplification and clarification' of the latter, 92 and not as a revision of the terms for legislative power of the Occupying Power. 93 Even so, the language of Article 64 clearly suggests that it peace treaty with Germany is legally not possible. For a peace treaty presupposes the continued existence of the opponent belligerents as subjects of international law and a legal state of war in their mutual relations.' Hans Kelsen, 'Is a peace treaty with Germany legally possible and politically desirable?', in American Political Science Review, Vol. 41, No. 6, 1947, p. 1188. 85 For a similar argument, see S. Chesterman, above note 76, p. 54; G. von Glahn, above note 4, pp. 275-286. 86 The Allies' confidence in the total defeat of Nazi Germany upon crossing the German border was partly accountable for their decision not to treat the law of occupation as the authority for occupation: E. Benvenisti, above note 52, p. 91. broadens the prescriptive power of the Occupying Power by articulating specific objectives underlying the notion of necessity. 94 Further, in establishing a more elastic dimension of the occupier's legislative power, Article 64 gives primacy to the necessity of securing the rights and wellbeing of the occupied population. This is supported by a profusion of positive duties incumbent on occupiers under the Fourth Convention. In this respect, it should be remembered that one of the main contributions of this treaty is to furnish a 'bill of rights' for the local population. 95 Presumably, such a shift in emphasis in favour of the rights of the local population mirrors the evolution of international human rights law and the rise of the welfare states in Europe (and the New Deal thinking of the United States administration before and during World War II). In essence, under the Fourth Geneva Convention the primary beneficiaries of the necessity grounds are switched from the political and military elites of the ousted sovereign state, who were anxious to see their laws and institutions preserved upon their return, to the occupied population with whom sovereignty is endowed. 96 This point can be of special pertinence to cases of 'prolonged occupation', 97 where necessity grounds can be invoked to justify novel laws to address the evolving social needs of the civilian population. 98 Failure to acknowledge the status of occupation and non-application of the law of occupation during the Cold War
In post-1949 academic discourse, while the 'demise' of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations has never been declared, 99 scholarly discussion of the legislative capacity of the Occupying Power under this provision (and under Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention) has been subdued, save in the case of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. 100 This can partly be explained by the fortuitous ground that the law of occupation has rarely been relied upon by the relevant states. Most have failed to recognize the applicability of the law of occupation to de facto occupied territories, 101 irrespective of whether or not these resulted from proxy wars of the two superpowers during the Cold War. 102 This left debates both on the prescriptive power of the Occupying Power and indeed on the entire normative framework of the law of occupation nearly dormant for several decades. The law of occupation was excluded because the concept of occupation as such was mistakenly associated with a 'defunct' or even illegal regime. 103 This can be partly accounted for in the light of the special normative importance attached to the right to self-determination of peoples during and after the process of decolonization. 104 Furthermore, reluctance of the potential or de facto occupiers to recognize the status of occupation can be explained by a litany of onerous positive duties that the Fourth Geneva Convention would impose on them. 105 The occupation of Iraq: the law of occupation 'resuscitated' and the broad legislative authority of the occupiers 113 As the primary concern of the law of occupation is to secure the rights and wellbeing of inhabitants in occupied territories, it is essential that any modifications to this body of international humanitarian law be made in a clear and explicit manner. 114 While the relevant Council resolutions accorded the CPA wide legislative authority to implement 'transformative' objectives in political and economic fields in a manner unchecked by the constraints of the laws of occupation, 115 the CPA's legislative measures were not free from controversy. 116 Clearly, the Iraqi experience has contributed to obliterating any political inhibition in recognizing the status of occupation. Since then, the international authorities have been willing to acknowledge such status in a variety of scenarios. Aside from its Advisory Opinion in the Wall case, 117 the International Court of Justice, in its contentious case of the Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo, recognized Uganda as the Occupying Power in the Ituri region. 118 Similarly, the Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission found cases of belligerent occupation in the territories adjacent to the border between the countries. 119 These episodes mark a striking contrast with the tendency in the preceding decades to avoid acknowledging states of occupation openly. 120 However, they have yet to raise any major issues of the legislative competence of the respective Occupying Powers.
Concluding observations of the historical survey of the law of occupation
In the period between 1815 and 1949, many Occupying Powers flouted their obligations or claimed exceptional broader legislative authority by citing diverse justifications. Nevertheless, the conservationist principle as a general rule governing the entire corpus of the law of occupation has largely resisted historical vicissitudes. The primary reason for the longevity of this principle underlying Article 43 of the Hague Regulations lies in the application of the 'necessity' grounds as malleable exceptions. Similarly, the broadened parameters of the necessity grounds under Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention are likely to sustain the general rule on the Occupying Power's legislative authority under this provision. 121 The provision is sufficiently elastic and well equipped to justify legislative measures to address a variety of political realities and reform agenda in occupied territories. 122 As an ancillary ground, one can add that to call into question the conservationist premise of the law of occupation would result in challenging the transient nature of this normative regime. This would be at variance not only with the sovereignty of the occupied populace but also with their right to self-determination.
In essence, the legal regime of occupation is no exception to the thesis that law is a social construct contingent on divergent social realities. Hence, scholarly discourses surrounding this legal regime are amenable to different contemporary ideas and to political realities. 123 The exclusion of 'colonial occupation' from the normative corpus of the law of occupation
Overview
Our examinations now turn to the criticism that, until the process of decolonization unfolded, the law of occupation was largely the 'European project' 124 and was never contemplated as applicable to 'colonial occupation'. 125 This part critiques the historically iniquitous feature of the law of occupation during the colonial period. As seen in the preceding part, the law of occupation has been marred by many instances in which the 'concept of necessity' exception was invoked to justify deviating from the general rule as predicated on the conservationist idea. Yet these exceptions have always operated within the normative parameters of the law of occupation. In contrast, the inapplicability of the law of occupation to colonial control was none other than an exception made to the entire corpus of this body of jus in bello.
The proposed analysis of this part goes beyond examining the law of occupation as it has been in the past. As far back as the early nineteenth century, Jeremy Bentham implicitly recognized the framework of tripartite conceptualization (the law as it has been; the law as it is; and the law as it ought to be). 126 This analytical structure has recently been given fresh insight by Anthea Roberts. 127 Working along similar lines, it is proposed in this part that the parameters of our inquiry should be expanded to go beyond the law of occupation as it has been and to encompass the normative projection in retrospect of the law of occupation as it ought to have been. 128 Such critical analysis will help to elucidate different narratives and rationalizations regarding the ways in which the law of occupation has failed to be applied in the colonial context. This critical and contextual prism can also be of help in assessing how the application of today's law of occupation is vulnerable to the charge of 'political subjectivity'. 129 This part argues that, behind its façade of innocuous value-neutrality, the law of occupation had long hidden a tacit dichotomy: on the one hand, the application of this normative framework (and the entire corpus of jus in bello) only among 'civilized' nations capable of exercising sovereignty in international relations; and, on the other, the system of colonialism imposed upon the vast majority of non-Western nations bereft of sovereignty.
The methodology of this part is built on the underlying assumptions of the critical legal studies (CLS) movement. We should remember that, while proposing the (re-)unification of the law as it is and the law as it ought to be in its legal discourse, CLS highlights a contextual critique of the existing international legal structure. It advocates pursuing the anti-foundationist objective of unearthing heterogeneous identities and conflict of interests as the reality of international society. 130 Further, CLS's inclusive and culturally sensitive approach, 131 alongside its proposal to lift the 'veil of power', 132 reinforces our retrospective critique of the historically exclusive nature of the law of occupation. Spurred on by this methodology, this part aims to unmask the thinly veiled, binary assumption on which the whole gamut of jus in bello was based.
The era of imperialism and the exclusivity of the law of occupation
The century of 'relative peace' in (western) Europe between 1815 and 1914 coincided with the height of imperialism in its later period, with many European powers, small and large, vying for territorial aggrandizement and empire-building outside the continent. 'Occupying' and acquiring non-Western (or non-Christian) territories by aggression or coercion was hardly condemned as illegal. Many states firmly believed in their 'mission civilisatrice', despite 'uncivilized' practice against the indigenous populations. 133 Ralph Wilde observes that 'the idea of the "civilizing mission" ', as one of the underlying rationales of colonialism, was designed 'to address the perceived incapacity for self-government . . . and also to build up local capacities, sometimes with the goal of making self-administration, meeting the standard [of civilization], eventually possible'. 134 Such was the European Zeitgeist that the General Act of the Berlin Conference (1885) in effect legitimized the 'Scramble for Africa'. 135 Admittedly, in the nineteenth century not all instances of acquiring sovereign rights and territories outside Western states were realized through aggression. Even so, what appeared to be cases of 'pacific' occupation (occupatio pacifica) based on agreements between native rulers and European powers, or even agreements between the former and European corporations, 136 were often carried out in coercive circumstances. 137 Furthermore, some instances of colonial rule, far from being a benign model marked by development of economic and social infrastructure, were tainted with what would have constituted very serious violations of human rights if committed in metropolitan territories of 'civilized' nations. 138 Note that, even in Victorian Britain, there was a binary assumption upon which the British imperium et libertas was built: liberal political principles and practices that were defining features of the British domestic infrastructure were by no means wholeheartedly extended to the colonial possessions. 139 The tacit dichotomy between the legal regime of occupation applied among 'civilized' nations and the system of colonialism imposed upon 'uncivilized' nations This section aims to elaborate the thesis that the paradigms of the law of occupation essentially developed as a 'European project'. It can be assumed that, until the decolonization process was set in motion, with respect to non-consensual control over a foreign territory there operated a tacit dichotomy between the legal regime of occupation that was applicable only among 'civilized' European states and the system of colonial rules over 'uncivilized' peoples. None of the corpus of jus in bello was considered applicable to 'colonial occupation' or forced annexation of nonEuropean territories. 140 As a comparison, one can note that it was only in the case of debellatio 141 that the normative paradigm of belligerent occupation was ruled out with respect to European powers.
This binary thinking was no doubt grounded on the idea that sovereignty was a 'gift of civilization'. 142 Sovereignty was almost always a privilege attributed only to members of the 'European family of states', 143 to the exclusion of nonEuropean nations. 144 Because non-Western societies were not entitled to sovereignty, the invisible barrier that separated the 'civilized' from 'uncivilized' nations disabled the application of the entirety of jus in bello to armed conflict that led to 'colonial occupation' of non-Western societies. 145 Bhuta argues that The anomalous (from the classical international law point-of-view) distinction between effective control and sovereign rights over territory which lies at the heart of the law of occupation, and the law's enjoining of fundamental constitutional change by the military occupant, had no application to colonial wars or 'police actions' against less civilized -and therefore non-sovereignpeoples and territories. 146 As a result, military occupation of non-European territories was sufficient for the European powers to claim sovereign rights over those territories. 147 Further, together with discovery, conquest, and cession, the occupation of terra nullius was one of the modalities that a 'civilized' nation was able to invoke to acquire sovereignty over the 'non-Christian world'. 148 As an ancillary argument, one can add that the temporary nature of the normative regime of occupation was unsuitable for the colonial powers' avowed intention to exert sovereignty over the colonized territories. 149 It should be borne in mind that, by the time imperialism held sway in the late nineteenth century, many rules relating to occupation were already embodied in the Lieber Code (1863), the aborted Brussels Project (1874), and the Oxford Manual (1880). Further, many 'occupations' of territories in the course of imperial adventures took place after the First Hague Peace Conference (1899). 150 Bhuta contends that 'As a matter of principle and practice, belligerent occupation in its 19th-century manifestation was applied exclusively to land wars between European sovereigns.' 151 The conceptual chasm between the 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' nations can be readily discerned. During the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the Prussians arguably applied the customary law of occupation, leaving the French laws relatively intact. 152 Similarly, in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the US occupying forces retained the Spanish functionaries in Manila. 153 During the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), it was the British occupying forces' deviation from the body of customary norms on occupation that prompted Spaight to criticize the measures taken against the Dutch-speaking populations. 154 In contrast, the cosmopolitan and once mighty Ottoman Empire was not considered fully 'civilized'. Accordingly, the Russian occupation of Bulgaria in 1877-1878 was excluded from the constraints of the occupation law, and this was pleaded by none other than Fyodor F. Martens. 155 Turning to the system of colonialism outside Europe, its exclusion from the legal regime of occupation matched a purported aim: the vast swathes of the landmass inhabited by 'uncivilized peoples' were poised for imperial spoils and conquest by European powers that were unshackled by the normative paradigm of jus in bello governing conduct of warfare and belligerent occupation, and possible war crimes. 156 Along these lines, Koskenniemi argues that 'the law of colonial occupation that emerged in the late-19 th century' had an advantage of 'enabl[ing] the colonial powers to rule over non-Europeans without the administrative burdens of formal sovereignty'. 157 Many commentators argue that such an exclusion of the legal regime of belligerent occupation was sustained by the idea of racial hierarchy. 158 
'Standard of civilization'
For Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens, the champion of the eponymous clause, 159 universalist conceptions of international law were only integrated among Western civilized peoples. 160 He was adamant that 'it would be impossible to expect Turks or Chinese to observe the laws and customs of war as elaborated by the common efforts of the Christian and civilised nations'. 161 Francis Lieber's 'martialist' backbone, not dissimilar to his anti-abolitionist ethos in the United States domestic setting, 162 was faithfully replicated in his understanding that 'The fundamental idea of all international law is the idea that all civilized nations of our race form a family of nations'. 163 These views are closely intertwined with the idea of the 'standard of civilization'. 164 This idea denotes the 'legal mechanism' by which nations have historically been admitted to or barred from the 'international society of states'. 165 In Gerrit Gong's thesis, the international society of European states was equated to 'international society' as a whole, because this was the only 'society' comprised of 'civilized states'. 166 The assumption underlying this thesis is that, in encounters between European and non-European peoples and in the case of any 'civilization clashes', the European standard of civilization that bore 'the hallmarks of the evolving Westphalian states' system' was deemed superior to standards of civilization espoused by non-Western peoples. As a corollary, the European standard of civilization constituted the benchmark against which different 'levels of civilization' attained by non-Western states were measured. 167 
Concluding observations of the exclusivity of law of occupation
This part has demonstrated that, because the law of occupation was developed chiefly as a social construct among European powers entitled to sovereignty, it trivialized the fate of non-Western peoples divested of sovereignty. Remarkably, one of the few early Western publicists to voice concern about such a dichotomized understanding was Hersch Lauterpacht. While criticizing James Lorimer's debarring of 'barbarous, and savage societies' from the application of both the concept of sovereignty and the general corpus of international law, 168 this erudite publicist asserted in 1947 that 'Modern international law knows of no distinction, for the purposes of recognition, between civilized and uncivilized States or between States within and outside the international community of civilized States'. 169 The dichotomized framework that prevailed from the nineteenth century until the midtwentieth century was normatively incongruent. As Anghie notes, 170 while nonWestern nations were divested of sovereignty, 171 many chartered corporations of Western powers designed for colonial enterprises 172 were invested with the 'sovereign' rights to enter into treaties with non-Western nations to acquire 'sovereignty' over their land. Furthermore, and ironically, non-Western nations were considered 'sovereigns' only for the purpose of transferring their sovereignty to the corporation. 173 Indeed, in our post-colonial world the nations of the developing world are united in asserting that, far from having lacked sovereignty, their ' "native sovereignty" survived the international system of colonialism'. 174 In conclusion, the exemption of 'colonial occupation' from the constraints of the law of occupation facilitated colonial control by European powers. While this was a serious cognitive disharmony, it was rationalized on the basis of the 'standard of civilization'.
General conclusion
The first main part of this article surveyed the historical evolution of the law of occupation through the lens of the general rules relating to the Occupying Power's legislative authority. It focused on the conservationist principle under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and on the elastic ways in which the 'concept of necessity' exception has been construed in both practice and legal doctrines. It demonstrated how the concept of 'necessity' under Article 43 has served as the 'fluid vocabulary' in adjusting to differing needs of Occupying Powers. 175 When supplemented by Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, this concept has been adjusted in the direction of promoting the rights and wellbeing of civilian populations under occupation. The analyses undertaken in both parts of the article corroborate the thesis that law is 'a form of congealed politics', 176 and that the entirety of legal discourse as a social construct stresses the importance of contextual analysis and understanding. 177 This can be demonstrated by many doctrinal endeavours, whether cogent or not, to rationalize what appear to be deviations from the general rule predicated on the conservationist ethos.
On the other hand, the second main part of the article, which critiqued issues of the exclusion of 'colonial occupation' from the law of occupation, lends succour to one of the main theses of the critical legal studies movement -that the law as the system of regulatory control is contingent upon, and parasitic on, 'institutionalized social power'. 178 Until the period of decolonization, the entire conceptual edifice of the law of occupation remained embedded in the then exclusive 'international society', which, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, comprised only the European and North American family of 'civilized nations'. The law of occupation was the product of limited 'interpretive communities', 179 equipped with the enduring legacy of the concept of the 'standard of civilization'. 'Unearthing' the hidden parallel process (the barring of 'colonial occupation' from the regulatory realm of the law of occupation) reveals how our social knowledge of this distinct branch of international humanitarian law has been contingent on particular historicity, inter-subjective dialogues, compromise, and normative projection of the privileged and exclusive circle of 'civilized' states. 180 
